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Berner: The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FALL
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
BRUCE G. BERNER*

INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution poses two
substantive questions about governmental searching. The first, what is a
search?, might be called the amendment's "reach" and could be restated: what
general type of governmental activity is this amendment interested in scrutinizing
and regulating? The second and logically subsequent question--which searches
are unreasonable?--might be termed the amendment's "grasp" and could be
restated: from this universe of searches, which are permitted and which
prohibited? It is, after all, only "unreasonable" searches that the constitution
prohibits.
To demonstrate this "reach-grasp" dichotomy--consider the eighthamendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 2 The word
"punishment" marks the amendment's "reach" or outer boundary; it is
"punishment" that the provision means to scrutinize. It is not concerned with
cruel and unusual dogs.
A court must first interpret what is meant by
punishment and then scrutinize all punishment, so defined, to decide if it is
"cruel and unusual". For example, assume that D argues that a $5.00 fine for
the crime of overparking is cruel and unusual punishment. The court must first
determine whether or not a monetary fine is within the meaning of punishment
for eighth-amendment purposes. Let us assume it so finds and that it then
determines that there is nothing cruel or unusual about this punishment. In my
terminology the eighth amendment has "reached" this case, meaning that it is

* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.A. and LL.B.,
Valparaiso University; LL.M., Yale University. I originally delivered parts of this particle at my
Inaugural Lecture at the Valparaiso University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the
assistance of Jeffrey C. Boulden in the preparation of this article.
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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an appropriate case for eighth-amendment scrutiny, but has not "grasped" it
because the sentence is not invalidated.
The fourth-amendment "reach" cases are today in wild disarray and the
subject of widespread attack. Supreme Court commentators are, of course,
always "troubled by," or "baffled by," or "view with great alarm" almost any
line of Supreme Court cases. Fourth-amendment commentators are in an
apoplectic frenzy over the "reach" decisions. Professor Wayne LaFave
(recently canonized by a Texas court as the "patron saint of the search and
seizure law")4 has written several insightful articles on the question.' One
piece is a full-text, justice-by-Supreme Court justice opinion in a hypothetical
case which is (a) absolutely consistent with past opinions, and (b) delightfully
incoherent. 6
The thesis of today's lecture is that the disarray, while it is particularly
notorious because of recent decisions, springs from the fact that the Supreme
Court has never formulated a coherent test for "reach."
It has, instead,
historically confused the "reach" and "grasp" problems. While this confusion
has generated decisions which are profoundly odd, 7 it has done far worse; it has
assured that many potential governmental abuses cannot, without starting from
scratch on the "reach" formulation, be correctly decided absent legislative
intervention. While commentators for the most part agree (and I do too) that the
Supreme Court is answering the question wrong, I argue that the problem is
deeper. The Court is answering the wrong question.
This article's outline is as follows: Section A describes the Court's
approach to the "reach" issue, tests its operation against 10 cases (some real and
some hypothetical), and evaluates its performance. Section B sets forth a

3. See, e.g., Junker, The Structure of the FourthAmendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989); Reich, Administrative SearchesforEvidence of Crime: The
Impact of New York v. Burger, 5 ToURo L. REv. 31 (1988); Serf, Great Expectations of Privacy:
A New Modelfor FourthAmendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583 (1989); Steinberg, Making
Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563 (1990); Stewart, Florida v. Riley: The
Emerging Standardfor Aerial Surveillance of the Curtilage, 43 VAND. L. REv. 275 (1990).
4. Juarez v. State, 758 S.W. 2d 772, 784 (rex. Crim. App. 1988).
5. See, e.g., LaFave, Controlling Discretionby AdministrativeRegulations: The Use, Misuse,
and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in FourthAmendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REv. 442
(1990); LaFave, The FourthAmendment Today: A BicentennialAppraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1061
(1987); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: 'Second to None in the Bill of Rights", 75 ILL. B.J. 424
(1987); LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Processof 'Factualization' in the
Search and Seizure Cases", 85 MICH. L. REv. (1986).
6. LaFave, A Fourth Amendment Fantasy: The Last (Heretofore Unpublished) Search and
Seizure Decision of the Burger Court, 669 U. ILL. L. REv. (1986).
7. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Dow Chem. Co., v. United States, 476
U.S. 227 (1986).
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proposed new "reach" formulation, tests it by the same cases, and evaluates its
performance.
You will not be surprised to hear me predict now that the new formulation
works better. It does not, of course make all the difficult issues go away:
many remain problematic and controversial; some of the questions are
unalterably hard and politically charged. But it does make many of the difficult
issues disappear because those issues were themselves generated by the
confusion about "reach" and "grasp." Beyond that, the proposal has two
decisive advantages over current doctrine: (1) the hard questions remain for the
courts, where constitutional questions belong, and not for the legislature; and (2)
a wrong answer in one case does not doom us to Orwellian consequences in the
next.
Section C recognizes that a proposal as radical as the one made is not,
regardless of its coherence, likely to be instituted. However, some of the
principles inherent in it could be grafted upon current "reach" doctrine to
improve it. Those possibilities are briefly identified.
One final word of introduction. My proposed formulation will denominate
considerably more police activity a "search" than is currently the case. But
before you brand me an unabashed (dare I use the word in this kinder, gentler
age?) liberal, bear in mind that to hold any given police activity a "search"
merely opens fourth-amendment debate. We can then argue about which police
searches are reasonable and which are not. To hold that same activity not a
"search", however, is to close debate.
A.

The Current Reach Formulation

1. Description
The fourth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated.... "I
Prior to 1967, this cited language prompted the Court to apply two tests for
reach. One focused on "place" and one on governmental activity. The Court
required that both hurdles be jumped before it would address the reasonableness
question. The first hurdle, does the case involve a place that the fourth

8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. There is a second clause about warrants and probable cause, see
supra note 1, but it has nothing to do with "reach" and at the "grasp" level is wholly subservient
to the cited clause.
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amendment is concerned with?, is typified by Hester v. United States,9 a case
which held that any amount of governmental seeking in an "open field,"
property of the defendant outside the house's protection, could not be a search.
The second hurdle, did the police engage in the type of activity that the
amendment means to scrutinize?, is typified by Olmstead v. United States,' °
which held that police eavesdropping from one hotel room to the next with a
detectaphone (a device that does not physically penetrate the wall) was not a
search because it entailed no physical trespass. Thus, until 1967, there was no
fourth-amendment debate until the police trespassed into a relatively short list
of "protected places.""
In 1967 the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States, 2 the polestar
"reach" case. In Katz, a defendant was making a phone call from a glassenclosed public pay telephone. Federal police attached an electronic device to
the top of the booth and recorded the conversation which became evidence in
Katz's trial under federal gambling laws. The Court rejected both halves of its
old "reach" doctrine. First, as to place, it rejected "persons, houses, papers
and effects" as being an exclusive list of protected places and treated those
words as merely evocative of places where the privacy interest is most keenly
felt. It broadened the "place" part of reach to all places where a person has an
actual and reasonable expectation of privacy."
The Katz expansion of
constitutional protection fits nicely with other decisions of the liberal Warren
Court, in full sail by 1967.' Having formulated this "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test, the Court then held it reasonable to expect that private phone
conversations, even when made in a public phone booth, are not being
surreptiously recorded. As to the "police activity" side, the Court stated that,
given the state of technology, one need not identify a trespass to find a
search.' 5 What did the Court replace trespass with? Nothing. The idea of
measuring "reach" by looking at the police and their activities dropped out of

9. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
10. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
11. Over the years the Supreme Court developed a list of places that triggered fourth
amendment scrutiny. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warehouses); Schmer v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (a person's body); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1966) (a person's
clothing); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (apartments); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964) (hotel rooms); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (automobiles); Taylor v.
United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garages); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932)
(business offices).
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Id. at 353.
14. Several Warren Court decisions expanded the protections afforded criminal suspects. See
e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to give specific warnings to
suspects in custody); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (expanding fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures to state cases).
15. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
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the analysis for all practical purposes. The whole question regarding "reach"
now focuses on "place." 6 Which places? All places in which a person
entertains a "reasonable expectation of privacy." This focus is on the citizen;
it's not on the government. As I hope to demonstrate, however, taking one's
eyes off of the government when doing fourth-amendment jurisprudence is a
dangerous game.
The opportunity that the Court missed in Katz occurred immediately after
it held that "persons, houses, papers and effects" was not an exhaustive list of
protected places but rather that privacy interests may exist in countless places
and contexts. Once it said that, the Court could have noticed that it was now
analyzing the Constitutional text as if it read:
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated;
All that would have remained, therefore, would be to define what "search"
meant in terms of "governmental activity." Instead, the Court, loathe to remove
all place limitation, reworked the place side with a vaguer but self-consciously
broader formulation--all places where there is a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." But why limit fourth-amendment protection to any place, however
broadly defined? Why not say that such protection goes with all people to all
places at all times?
I must concede that a public street affords less privacy than a home. But
privacy in general is not the fourth amendment's concern. Its concern is
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, a freedom which is not
sensibly circumscribed by time or place. A policeman can, to be sure, properly
observe a great deal about us when we are in a public place. This is not,
however, because the fourth amendment should not apply in a public place, but
because his observations in public places are much less likely to be
unreasonable.

16. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan wrote:

As the Court's opinion states, "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people.
Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a "place." My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
Id.at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1991
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2. Testing
At this point, I must introduce several hypothetical cases involving police
activity that may or may not constitute a "search."
Ransacker thinks x has contraband in his house. He breaks into x's house
to look.
Trueheart notices a house afire. He sees a child at a second-story window
screaming, "Help!" He runs in and rescues her.
Glancer, walking along a public sidewalk, turns his head to the right and
sees through a window into x's house which is a few feet from the sidewalk.
Hunter and Digger receive an anonymous tip that x, who owns a 198-acre
ranch, is operating an illegal drug-making operation in a barn about sixty yards
from his house and that he has killed a cohort who threatened to expose the
operation and buried him in the field near the barn. Hunter enters x's property,
scales three or four fences, passes several "No Trespassing" signs, walks up to
the barn, and shines a flashlight through a mesh covering the doorway.
Digger's crew, using heavy equipment, digs a series of holes near where the
tipster indicated the body had been buried.
Troller and Excavator engage in the same activities as Hunter and Digger
but they have received no tip. They simply think that x looks like a "hippy
commie freak with a lot to hide".
Neighborly acting on a tip that x deals drugs from his house, obtains
permission from x's next-door neighbor to look into x's house from the
neighbor's strategically located second-floor window.
The Flying Eagle-Eyes, officers Smith and Jones, receive an anonymous tip
that x is growing marijuana in (a) his backyard garden and (b) his backyard
greenhouse. Unable to see either from ground level without trespassing, Smith
hires a plane and Jones a helicopter to look. Smith sees the marijuana in the
garden from 1,000 feet and Jones the marijuana in the greenhouse from 400
feet, each with the naked eye!
Vengeful hates x and would love to see him prosecuted from anything but
has no indication of criminal activity. He recruits several colleagues and they
all hover in helicopters over x's property for several hours.
Resourceful believes that x is dealing drugs from his third-flour apartment.
He rents a third-floor apartment across the street and, with the aid of binoculars
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol25/iss3/3
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and a Startron (a device which illuminates darkened areas), conducts a
continuous, nine-day surveillance of the apartment.
Peeker hears that x, a divorced man, is being visited by his thirteen-year
old daughter. Knowing that x is a long-haired, bearded author of fiction, Peeker
concludes that incest is certain to occur. Remembering that x's house has a
skylight over the bed in the master bedroom, he rents a helicopter and observes
the bedroom for several nights.
As we go through these cases, testing the court's formulation of which of
these policemen are "searching," I shall indicate which are decided cases and
which are hypotheticals. These cases all involve the residence and surrounding
lands and buildings. I have chosen this line of cases because it is representative
of others, is the most fully developed line, and has been the subject of much
recent Supreme Court activity.
Ransacker's case is a prototype of many cases. The conduct involved is not
only a "search" but the paradigmatic search--bodily physical trespass into the
house, the most protected of places. 7
Trueheart's case is also a search and for the same reasons as Ransacker's.
You might argue that Trueheart is not searching in the ordinary meaning of the
term. You would be right. But, as discussed above, the Court's formulation
is much more interested in "where?" than "why?" The policeman is searching
within the constitutional meaning of the term in that he has physically entered
a house.'" Nobody would have any difficulty, however, holding that this
"search" was not only reasonable, but heroic.
Glancer's case, modeled on many reported cases, 9 is not a "search."
The homeowner cannot reasonably expect that any "curious passerby" would
not, from a public sidewalk, look into his house. As a matter of fact, it does
not matter under these facts whether Glancer inadvertently sees the evidence or
is purposefully looking for it--a passerby is "curious,"
and "need not avert his glance."
The case of Hunter and Digger is not the bizarre creation of a crazed law
professor but a combination of decisions holding that policemen are not

17. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) ("Without question, the home is
accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections.").
18. See, e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (holding that government offices
conducted a search of a suspect's house despite being allowed to enter by the suspect's wife).
19. See e.g., Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585

(1973).
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searching when they are in a person's "open field. "' Many commentators
thought that the Hester open-field doctrine was doomed after Katz, which
seemed to broaden the range of places reached by the fourth amendment. The
Supreme Court has maintained the doctrine, asserting that people entertain no
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in "open fields". Why not? Not much
explanation has been given for this other than precedent and the vague idea that
the place is "open". At any rate, there are no references in the "open fields"
cases to "curious passersby" because they would perforce be trespassers,
violating both tort and criminal law.
Troller and Excavator are hypothetical policemen who differ from Hunter
and Digger only in that they have no reason whatsoever to think they will find
anything. We can imagine their motivation any way we like--racism,
xenophobia, political or merely personal dislike for the owner. You see, of
course, that it doesn't matter. As the Court has already held that police in an
open field are by definition not searching, it does not matter how unreasonable
their actions become. Whatever they do and for whatever reason, so long as
they remain in this unprotected place, they remain invisible to the fourth
amendment.
Neighborly's case has been consistently defined by lower courts as "no
search. " A Pennsylvania court concluded that because the activity was in plain
sight of the neighbor, the homeowner had "exposed his transaction to the
public" and, therefore, could not reasonably expect it to remain private. 2 But
private from whom? It is one thing to group police with the general public, the
"curious passersby," and quite another to select the one uninvited eye in the
world that can physically observe a house, make him a surrogate for the public,
and permit the police to stand in his shoes.
The Flying Eagle-Eyes is an amalgam of two recent Supreme Court
decisions, California v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley,' that have set off
storms of criticism. The Court held in each case that the police were not
searching. In each case the police were acting on a suspicion born of an
anonymous tip that the homeowner was growing marijuana, in Ciraolo in a
backyard garden, in Riley in a backyard greenhouse. In neither case, due to
fences, terrain, etc. was the suspected evidence visible from any public
groundspace, neighbor's yard, or the suspects' "open fields". Thus, the police
took to the air, in Ciraolo in a fixed-wing airplane at 1,000 feet and in Riley in

20. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); United States ex rel. Saiken v.
Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
21. Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242 P. Super. 194, 198, 363 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1976).
22. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
23. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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a helicopter at 400 feet. New heights of visual acuity were reached since each
policeman made a naked-eye identification of marijuana.'
Even though the illegal crop was not in the house, it was within the house's
"curtilage" (from "courtyard").'
The curtilage, with long historical roots
mostly associated with common-law burglary,' is roughly defined as that area
intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where
privacy expectations are most heightened."
Its boundary is formed by
distance, by physical enclosure (as by a fence), and by function. For those of
you who disdain long-winded lawyer's explanations for straight talk, the
"curtilage" is the "yard". Most of us who own houses in a suburban area own
a house together with curtilage--no open fields. For those of you who own a
larger spread, your "open field" begins where your curtilage ends.
Curtilage has consistently been accorded protected status, both pre- and
post-Katz.2 At least that has been the rhetoric. Research, however, discloses
not a single Supreme Court case that has protected the curtilage as such. In
Ciraoloand Riley, after stating that the curtilage was indeed protected, the Court
held that neither homeowner could reasonably expect that their illegal crops
would not be seen from the air. In neither case, of course, was there a physical
trespass onto the curtilage, but, remember, after Katz, a trespass is not
necessary to a finding of a "search." Again, the Court did not refer to police
motivation, which was quite clear from the record. Again the Court addressed
the question from the citizen focus: Did these homeowners have a reasonable
expectation of privacy? In answering this question in the negative, the court
arrayed a series of arguments:
(1) The various aircraft were in public, navigable airspace, in compliance
with all applicable FAA altitude regulations; therefore, the police were merely
where any member of the public might lawfully be;'
(2) Any member of this flying public who "glanced down" could have seen
everything that the officers observed; 3°

24. The Supreme Court has also validated aerial searches involving mechanical surveillance
equipment. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (aerial search using a floormounted, precision aerial mapping camera).
25. For an excellent discussion of "curtilage," see Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853
(9th Cir. 1968).
26. See, e.g, Hutchins v. State, 3 Ga. App. 300, 59 S.E. 848 (1907).

27.

1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 410 (2d

ed. 1987) [hereinafter W. LAFAVE].
28. Id. at 410-11.
29. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 n.3 (1989).
30. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
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(3) Ciraolo's backyard, fenced as it was, though not visible to the common
passerby, might have been visible from the upper half of a double-decker bus
(Prof. LaFave notes that there are no double-decker buses in Santa Clara).31
(4) No "intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage
were observed." 32
In broader terms, the Court said that overflights by the public were not so
rare that the homeowners could claim they "reasonably expected" no one to
survey from the air. In the next section, some of these arguments will be
analyzed.
Just what do Ciraolo and Riley leave of the principle that the curtilage is
a protected place? Note the places from which the curtilage may be viewed:
public ground space;33 public airspace;' the property of any adjacent
neighbor;35 the homeowner's "open field."'
Apparently the curtilage is
protected only against physical trespass by the police. Of course, this is at odds
with Katz which stated that trespass was not necessary. Thus, those items a
homeowner wishes to remain private in the curtilage must be placed under cover
or underground. (If we take Digger, for example, and put him in the curtilage,
he would probably be searching.)
There is an argument, not explored by the Court, by which one can justify
the Ciraolo and Riley outcomes. It begins by noting that the protection extended
to the curtilage is not extended for the curtilage's own sake, that is, to protect
the curtilage itself from view, but as a means to protect the house. Indeed, the
burglary history of curtilage sees that space in just this way. If one can keep
people from physically entering the curtilage, one increases the privacy and
security of the house. The policeman who walks across a lawn to the house's
window gains a better view inside the house. Because there is typically little
evidence in the curtilage that cannot be seen from outside it, protecting it from
trespass only does not protect its privacy, but does create a kind of buffer zone
in service of the house's privacy. This would not protect the house, of course,
in those situations (like Neighborly's) in which the policeman can view the
house's interior from outside the curtilage.
Vengeful's case is a hypothetical indicating how stating the holding of

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 211.
Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
See supra text accompanying note 20.
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Ciraolo and Riley in terms of "reach" rather than "grasp" renders the fourth
amendment powerless to reach governmental activity that we all may agree is
outrageous. The Court could not distinguish Vengeful from The Flying EagleEyes since that case did not turn on the reasonableness of the police activity but
on inquiries into the "expectations" of the homeowner from real and
hypothetical air travellers."
Staker is based upon a Pennsylvania case.' The spying itself, both nakedeye and binocular-aided, was held not a search. As the court noted, the
apartment owners "did not place covers over the windows."'39 The startron,
however, was viewed as presenting a "difficult issue."' The court did not
bring itself to say that such use of a startron would always be a search, but held
that, because the nine-day surveillance observed two acts of sexual intercourse
wholly unrelated to the suspected criminal activity (engaged in by persons not
the subject of any suspicion), it was a search. 4'
Peeker's case is the hypothetical which most scares me. I would like to
think that the Court would find this a search, but it has left itself precious little
doctrinal room to do so. If the curtilage is protected, as the Court insists in
Ciraoloand Riley, yet there is no reasonable expectation that aerial surveillance
will not view it, on what basis can the Court distinguish the case of aerial
surveillance into a house? Note the factors that can be arrayed in 'support of
finding Peeker's skylight viewing not a search:
42

(1) Seeing into a house is not necessarily a search;
43
(2) Peeker, in public airspace, is in a place he has a right to be;
(3) Any member of the flying public could have obtained this
observation;"4
(4) No trespass is involved;'
(5) The homeowner did not cover the skylight.'

37. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1986).
38. Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 431 A.2d 964 (1981).
39. Id. at 500, 431 A.2d at 966.
40. Id. at 500, 431 A.2d at 966.
41. Id. at 500, 431 A.2d at 966.
42. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at 390.
43. See e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
44. Id. at 213-14.
45. Even if a trespass was involved, that fact alone would not make Peeper'sconduct violative
of the fourth amendment, See generally, Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232
(1986).
46. See Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242 Pa. Super 194, 363 A.2d 1227 (1976) (narcotics
suspect, by only using sheer curtains on his windows, exposed his criminal conduct to a police
officer on surveillance).
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When these factors are examined in service of the question "Should the
homeowner have reasonably expected that his activities would remain private?"
the issue seems in grave doubt.
3. Evaluation
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" formulation is, I believe, the
wrong question to be asking wholly apart from the matter of whether or not the
Court is doing a good job of answering it. (It isn't.) The Court is forced by
this formulation into one of two unpleasant postures, and cases demonstrate it
has adopted both: either it must simply conclude by tour de force that given
expectations are unreasonable or it must offer logical support. Let us examine
some of the justifications the Court has offered.
a. The Analogy to Private Citizens
As discussed above, courts often invoke images of the general public,47
the curious passersby, 4 the flying public,49 or a surrogate for the public
(neighbors, for example)" to find expectations of privacy unreasonable. It is
interesting to note how this analogy comes and goes in the cases. Sometimes
we hear about these folks and sometimes we do not; often the reason we do not
is that these folks, should they do what the police have done, would be
committing torts or crimes. Of course the curious passerby may glance, even
purposefully look, into a house from the sidewalk. But if he begins walking
through open fields, looking in buildings or digging up the earth, he will need
a good lawyer. He could fly over your property, but if he stakes you out with
binoculars and startrons, he might be liable in tort for "invasion of privacy"5
or "outrage" 2 and prosecutable criminally under Peeping-Tom Statutes.53
Imagine this scene. The Mayor of that City in Florida in which the Riley
helicopter case occurred holds a moonlight-swim party in his fenced-in
backyard. Suddenly a helicopter appears and remains over the pool. The

47. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
48. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 678 P.2d 60 (1984); see also 1 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 27, at 399.
49. See Riley, 484 U.S. at 450.
50. See Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242 Pa. Super. 194, 198, 363 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1976).
51. For a discussion of causes of action based upon an invasion of privacy see W. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
52. Some states recognize a separate tort of outrage, which is synonymous with intentional
infliction of emotion distress. See, e.g., Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 246 N.J. Super. 564,
588 A.2d 417 (1991).
53. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3545-4-5 (1988) (In Indiana, a person who "peeps" or enters the
land of another with the intent to peep commits voyeurism, a Class B misdemeanor.).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol25/iss3/3

Berner: The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment

1991]

FALL OF THE FOURTHAMENDMENT

395

furious Mayor calls the Chief of Police for quick action. Here is the
conversation: (I like to picture Paul Ford as the Mayor and Rod Steiger as the
Chief):
MAYOR: (After explaining the situation). Get this jerk out
of here.
CHIEF: Hold on, is he within the 400-foot FAA altitude
regulation?
MAYOR: What? Get him out of here.
CHIEF: It's not quite that simple. The Supreme Court says

he's in a place he has a right to be. You can't
reasonably expect that people in helicopters won't
see your pool. Why don't you put a tent over it?
That would protect it from curious passersby.
MAYOR: Listen, Chief. Number 1, your position is an
appointed position. Number 2 this guy is watching
us. He is sure as hell curious but he is not passing
by. He is hovering! That's not what public
airspace, as you put it, is for!
CHIEF: How about you turn the lights off? That would
help unless he's got a startron. I mean you can't
reasonably expect he does not. And, mayor,
lighten up and lower your voice. He might be
listening with a parabolic mike, which, along with
the helicopter and binoculars, is pretty standard
equipment for passersby these days.
MAYOR: Well, I'll be damned!

When doing constitutional jurisprudence, references to the legality or illegality
of actions of private citizens are usually beside the point. Tort law and criminal
law, among others, restrain private action. The Constitution restrains state
action. This latter restraint is sometimes more than the former, sometimes less.
If a policeman breaks into a house and seizes drugs, this is a search and seizure
testable under the fourth amendment. If a private citizen were to do the same
thing, he would commit burglary and theft. The fact that a private citizen may
or may not lawfully engage in a given action is neither necessary nor sufficient
to conclude that a policeman may or may not do that same act for a
4
governmental purpose.5

54. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). In rejecting the contention
that the EPA's aerial surveillance was subject to state laws applicable to private citizens, the court
stated:

Dow nevertheless relies heavily on its claim that trade secret laws protect if from
any aerial photography of this industrial complex by its competitors, and that this

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1991

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 [1991], Art. 3

396

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

b. The "Intimate Activities" Argument
In its decision in Riley (police in helicopter looking into greenhouse), the
Court noted: "As far as this record reveals, no intimate details connected with
the use of the home or curtilage were observed.... "" The Pennsylvania
startron case indeed seems to turn not on what the policeman did, but on what
he saw.' But with all due respect, how can one sensibly judge whether or not
activity is a search by reference to what is observed? If police break into your
house and find nothing, have they not been searching? Have you not suffered
the intrusion? This kind of retrospective reasoning is like saying that all events
which happen were perforce "foreseeable", or even "inevitable". I cannot
imagine how a person's right to privacy can, without compromising the very
idea of privacy, be rationally made to turn on what he does with it. The fourth
amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures not because they may
yield results but because, regardless of their yield, they are improper intrusions.
c. The Policeman's Location
Because the Katz question is framed in terms of the expectations of the
homeowner to be free from outside intrusion, the focus of the recent cases is,
as we have seen, on where the policeman is located rather than into what he
looks (or hears, etc.) into.57 Note the irony: the "reasonable expectation"
rubric, an approach by which the Warren Court self-consciously selected the
"protected-place" rather than the "police-activity" perspective, ends up under
the Burger-Rehnquist courts concentrating on where the policeman is physically
located rather than on what place he intrudes upon! To the extent the Court now
focuses on where a policeman "has a right to be" and not on what he has a
"right to view," something akin to the old trespass requirement is back with a
vengeance--the policeman needs only to justify his location, which is often
outside any protected area. And today, of course, there are considerably more

protection is relevant to our analysis of such photography under the Fourth Amendment.
That such photography might be barred by state law with regard to competitors,
however, is irrelevant to the questions presented here.
Id. at 232.
55. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
56. Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 431 A.2d 964 (1981). The court stated:
It is not necessary at this time and in this case to hold that every time a startron
or other device that "sees" through darkness is used by authorities to obtain evidence
without a search warrant the evidence must be suppressed. However, when such a
device is used for nine days to observe a private apartment frequented by other than
those sought by the police, including two acts of sexual intercourse not involving the
person, ... for whom the surveillance was established, then the warrantless observation
... has truly impermissibly invaded privacy.
Id. at 500, 431 A.2d at 966.
57. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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tools to intrude on people's privacy without physically trespassing into
"protected areas."'
B. A Proposed Reach Formulation
1. Description
The pre-Katz notion that "reach" was a function of two perspectives, place
and kind of activity, was attacked head on by Professor Anthony Amsterdam.
Referring to Katz, he stated:
If the word "intrusion" is used, as "violated" plainly was, to mean
only that interests protected by the fourth amendment have been
defeated by the "Government's activities," I have no quarrel with it.
The problem with the word lies in its subtle suggestion that a
particular kind or sort of government activity, labeled an "intrusion,"
is necessary to trigger the fourth amendment. But this, in my view,
was precisely the approach to fourth amendment coverage that Katz
decisively rejected.59
My argument is that this is precisely the approach that Katz
decisively missed. Professor Amsterdam continued:
The entire thrust of the opinion is that it is needless to ask successively
whether an individual has the kind of interest that the fourth
amendment protects and whether that interest is invaded by a kind of
governmental activity characterizable by its attributes as a "search."
Rather, a "search" is anything that invades interests protected by the
amendment.'°
I agree with Professor Amsterdam that there should be one test for "reach", not
two, but I suggest that the Court in Katz chose the wrong one. If we follow
Professor Amsterdam's suggestion that a search is "anything that invades
interests protected by the [fourth] amendment,"61 we must next identify those
interests. If we attempt to define them broadly as "privacy, security, liberty,"
the definition includes many interests protected by other constitutional
guarantees, by statutes, by common law, and some interests not protected at all.
58. See, e.g., Ex pare Maddox, 502 So.2d 786 (Ala. 1986) (use of binoculars to help police
see marijuana plants growing in a nearby field).
59. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 383 (1974)
[hereinafter Amsterdam].
60. Id.
61. Id.
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"Privacy"--what Justice Brandeis called "the most comprehensive ...and the
most valued by civilized men," the "right to be let alone"2--is a constellation
of interests protected, in its various forms, by the first amendment provisions
dealing with association' and religion,' the third amendment on troop
quartering,' the fifth-amendment privilege against self-incrimination, ' and
the ninth amendment retained-rights clause, 67 not to mention those privacycentered interests, like birth-control information,' which have been found
"emanating" and/or "penumbrating"" from the Constitution's text. By the
time we cull out these other aspects of privacy, the interest underlying the fourth
amendment is to be free from uninvited governmental intrusions. The fourth
amendment interest is, in short, to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. If we then turn around and define a "search" as "anything which
defeats this interest," we could be indicted on suspicion of felonious questionbegging.
Rather than define the activity in terms of the interest (a search is anything
that intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy) or the interest in terms of
activity (the fourth amendment protects those places we want free from
intrusion), I propose that we define the governmental activity in its own terms-that we take the word "search" to mean what it means. Pretty radical. My test
for "reach" is as follows: to search is physically to seek, through any of the
senses, for a governmental purpose, including, of course, crime detection.
This approach appears to be more consonant with the purpose of the Bill
of Rights. There are two ways of understanding what the people have said to
the government in these amendments. One is: we have these interests which
we list here and your job is to be careful not to defeat them. Under this
definition, the amendments truly form a Bill of Rights. In fourth amendment
terms, we have expectations of privacy from official surveillance. The courts'
monitoring function under this view entails keeping its eyes on us. What exactly
is our anti-search interest? What are our expectations? Are they reasonable?

62. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
63. See e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers Party, 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (holding that a statute that
required the Socialists Workers Party to disclose campaign contributors and recipients of campaign
funds was unconstitutional as applied to that political party).
64. See e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (individual cannot be compelled to
display the state's motto, "Live Free or Die," on his automobile license plate).
65. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967) ("The Third Amendment's
prohibition against unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects another aspect of privacy
from governmental intrusion.").
66. See e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
67. See L. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 963 n.59 (1988).
68. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
69. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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Did we draw the drapes or fail to cover our pools? Did we use all of our
technology to frustrate all of the government's technology? Sadly, we might not
have enough.
The second understanding of the Bill or Rights is: because we have interests
(which are sometimes identified herein clearly, sometimes not so clearly, and
sometimes not at all), here is a list of things you may not do.. Under this
definition, the amendments create a Bill of Prohibitions. In fourth-amendment
terms, don't search unless it is reasonable to do so. Under this conception, the
courts' job must be conducted much differently; it must keep its eye on the
government. What is it doing? And why? Under this proposal, the fourth
amendment's command of "reasonableness" is brought to bear on all
police/governmental activities which involve uninvited seeking. This second
conception is more in keeping with the Founder's purpose--not the
announcement of Rights (which they stated in the Declaration of Independence
were "self-evident"), but the restriction of a new, feared government.
There is not much help from the text of the first eight amendments in
selecting the "rights" or "prohibition" conception. The first amendment adopts
a prohibitive tone:

"Congress shall make no law ...abridging....

"'

So do

several of the other amendments. The sixth amendment, on the other hand,
adopts the entitling, or "rights" perspective: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial

...

And, of course,

the fourth amendment adopts both: "The right of the people to be secure ... "
is the "rights" perspective and "against unreasonable searches and seizures" the
"prohibition" perspective. The ninth amendment, however, lends support to the
prohibition perspective. It states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people. "I The word "retained" is inconsistent with the idea that the first eight
amendments had created rights. Those rights, along with those not mentioned,
must have pre-existed if one can sensibly speak of "retaining" them.
I anticipate the following general objection to my proposal that "search" be
defined as "any physical seeking for a governmental purpose": this defmnition
is entirely too broad. Everything a policeman does is searching under this
definition. Well, not everything. But, truth is, police do a lot of searching. It
is a large part of the job. However, it cannot be persuasively argued that
because activity happens routinely, the Constitution ought take no note of it-indeed, it ought to be especially interested in it. Of course, most of these
searches are reasonable. The fourth amendment will "reach" them, but it will

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
70.
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not "grasp" them. When they become unreasonable, however, the fourth
amendment will be there to strike them down.
I want to return to the eighth amendment analogy I referred to earlier to
show that the Court's fourth-amendment reach analysis is inconsistent with how
it does constitutional jurisprudence generally. Remember our friend who
contended that $5.00 for overparking was cruel and unusual? The most obvious
response is "No, it is not." That is essentially what the Supreme Court has
said. But that is not what the Court would say if it dealt with the eighth
amendment's reach the way it deals with that of the fourth. If it did, I imagine
the operative language of the opinion would read something like this:
Of course a $5.00-fine is not cruel and unusual, and we could decide
today's case on that ground. But logically anterior to the cruel and
unusual question lies the question of whether or not a monetary fine
is "punishment" within the meaning of the eighth amendment. If there
is no punishment, we need not address the "cruel and unusual" issue.
The clear history of this clause is about physical torture,
disproportionate incarceration, and, maybe, death. Surely when the
founders used the word "punishment" this is what they envisioned.
It certainly would not have occurred to James Madison et al. that a
clause animated by spectres of rack and screw, The Star Chamber and
The Spanish Inquisition, should be applied to the payment of money.
Thus, we hold today that a monetary fine is not "punishment" as that
term is used in the eighth amendment.
The following day, the legislature increases the penalty for overparking to
$500,000! You see, of course, that, short of overruling yesterday's decision,
the Court is stuck. It cannot get to the "cruel and unusual" question because it
held that monetary fine is not "punishment." I think that what has happened in
connection with the fourth amendment is not much different from this
hypothetical.
And, at bottom, what has happened, I think, is this. (I trust you will grant
me a short, political digression.) Using the Riley helicopter case as an example,
the Court, from a reading of the entire record, concluded that, under the
circumstances (including the anonymous tip), the police acted properly to detect
a suspected crime. The Court was, therefore, comfortable affirming Riley's
conviction. In reality, the Court took this comfort born of a judgment about the
conduct's "reasonableness" and translated it, because the "reach" doctrine is so
tractable to this, into a finding that the police were "not searching". This result
was similar to the result in my hypothetical eighth-amendment opinion where a
perfectly rational intuition that a $5.00 fine is not cruel and unusual is translated
into a holding that monetary fine is not "punishment".
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But what of those cases looming out there when the Court does not think
police
have acted properly or does think that $500,000 is cruel and unusual?
the
The Court will want the Constitution to "grasp" these cases but its "reach" will
be too short.
2. Testing
The proposed formulation--a search is any physical seeking for a
governmental purpose--is now tested against the same ten cases.
Ransacker's case is clearly a search, not because of where he is, but
because of what he is doing and why--he is physically seeking evidence of
crime. We need not ask what the homeowner "expected." The issue of
reasonableness, which entails the "probable cause" and "warrant" requirements,
remains to be decided.
Trueheart is not searching. The critical motivation is missing. He is not
seeking for a governmental purpose.
Glancer is not searching if he glanced inadvertently in that direction, but
is searching if he purposefully looked. I shall deal with this special problem of
motivation in the next section. In any event, we will not, absent features which
aggravate his conduct, have any difficulty finding his actions reasonable. Here
the "curious passerby" becomes sensibly a part of the "reasonableness"
discussion.
The case of Hunter and Digger is clearly a search--they are physically
seeking evidence of crime. Is it reasonable? This we can argue about and
might decide to require that, to be reasonable, the police have some particular
level of suspicion (maybe probable cause but maybe a less stringent standard like
"reasonable suspicion"), or that they should have obtained prior judicial
approval, etc. Or we might not.
However we decide the "reasonableness" question in Hunter and Digger's
case, it will not prevent us from finding that Troller and Excavator are searching
and doing so unreasonably. Notice how conceding that Hunter and Digger are
searching and supplying some limitations on that searching leaves room for a
finding that Troller and Excavator are violating the fourth amendment's
command.
Neighborly's Case is also a search given his conduct and purpose. The
fourth amendment is in play. Again, the search's reasonableness involves some
balancing, but the Court could require more justification here when dealing with
a neighbor than when on the sidewalk with the general public.
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The Flying Eagle-Eyes are, of course, also searching. Having said that, we
can ignore odd questions about what the homeowner can expect or who else
could be flying there and concentrate on whether this sort of surveillance is
reasonable. Again, level of suspicion, the presence or absence of prior judicial
approval, and the exact techniques utilized to gain the observation all become
relevant inquiries.
Again, because The Flying Eagle-Eyes' case focused on appropriate
inquiries, we should have no trouble finding Vengeful's conduct to be an
unreasonable search. We are not blocked by a holding that his activity is not
a search in the first place.
Staker is clearly searching. I would certainly want to argue that this kind
of aggressive, long-term intrusion should require probable cause and a warrant
to be reasonable. Others may differ but at least we will not waste too much
time deciding whether or not Staker is doing something that the fourth
amendment is concerned about.
Peeker's case is clearly a search. The Court is fully free to examine the
reasonableness of the conduct, contrasting it with that of the Flying Eagle-Eyes
who saw into the backyard, not into the house itself. It is not necessarily an
easy question at a time when the fact and fear of crime is high. We may get it
wrong. But we are not bound to get it wrong as the Court faced with the
Ciraolo and Riley holdings may be.
3. Evaluation
The proposed "reach" formulation produces, I think, demonstrably better
and more sensible results in the tested cases. Its focus is on the police, not the
vague "expectations" of the average citizen. It frees the Court to scrutinize all
uninvited intrusions under the fourth amendment.
Yet, two categories of objections to the proposed formulation can be
anticipated. At the "reach" level, a test turning on governmental motivation
rather than location is more difficult to administer. A person's location is often
provable through direct evidence; his motivation must usually be proved
circumstantially. Once a policeman learns that certain motivations place his
activity outside the fourth amendment, what prevents him from always claiming
the innocent motivation? Aside from the obvious fact that police can attempt to
manipulate any rule (they can lie now as to where they were), most of the police
activity involved in these cases permit very unambiguous inferences about
motivation. What could Hunter and Digger or The Flying Eagle-Eyes claim to
have been their real purpose? The law, including Constitutional law, is rife with
instances in which a court must judge motivation, intent, premeditation,
knowledge, purpose, belief, etc. and it accomplishes this task, for the most part,
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without grave difficulty. In troublesome areas, courts can use well-proven legal
techniques to prevent abuse; the burden of proof, for example, can be imposed
on the government to disprove search motivation under all or specified
circumstances. One can, for example, easily imagine a rule which presumes a
search, absent strong rebutting evidence, whenever a policeman enters a house.
The second category of objection is that the proposed formulation, because
it recognizes so many more "searches", places undue stress on the "grasp"
issue--"reasonableness". It must be conceded that reasonableness doctrine will
have to be more finely tuned. Consider these observations of Professor
Amsterdam:
A sliding scale approach would considerably ease the strains that the
present monolithic model of the fourth amendment almost everywhere
imposes on the process of defining the amendment's outer boundaries
["reach"]. It would obviously be easier and more likely for a court
to say that a patrolman's shining of a flashlight into the interior of a
parked car was a "search" if that conclusion did not encumber the
flashlight with a warrant requirement but simply required, for
example, that the patrolman "be able to point to specific and
articulable facts" supporting a reasonable inference that something in
the car required his attention.Y
Having painted this picture (which I find eminently congenial), he lowers the
boom:
The problem with the graduated model, of course, is ...[that] it
converts the fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot. The
complaint is being voiced now that fourth amendment law is too
complicated and confused for policemen to understand or to obey. Yet
present law is a positive paragon of simplicity compared to what a
graduated fourth amendment would produce. The varieties of police
behavior and of the occasions that call it forth are so innumerable that
their reflection in a general sliding scale approach could only produce
more slide than scale.7'
It is often preferable, however, to adopt a rule which generates doctrinal
complexity rather than one which simplifies a problem by ignoring it. This is
especially true when ignoring it begs abuse, and, most especially, when that
abuse will come from the government.

73. Amsterdam, supra note 59, at 393.
74. Amsterdam, supra note 59, at 393-94.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has in fact, since Professor Amsterdam's
cited writing, already gone a very long way toward instituting the graduated
model of reasonableness. Current doctrine recognizes all of the following
concepts: physical restraint less than a typical arrest (called a "stop") 75
justified by less than the probable cause required for arrest; physical restraint
more intrusive than a common arrest (like killing the arrestee, at the extreme) 76
justifiable only under compelling circumstances;' and "searches" less intrusive
than typical ("frisks",' magnetometer scans at airports," administrative
searches,' ° etc.) as well as those searches uncommonly intrusive (strip
searches,"' body-cavity searches,' surgery to remove evidence," etc.), all
of which require respectively less or more justification than usual. The Court
seems quite comfortable administering this "sliding-scale" approach to
"reasonableness."
I do not believe that the task of fitting all the new "searches" into this
existing graduated model would be difficult. For example, the Court could
quickly establish that all naked-eye searches from public streets or sidewalks are
per se reasonable absent bizarre aggravating circumstances; that views into a
house from a consenting neighbor's property are justifiable upon a showing of
"reasonable suspicion"; that views into houses utilizing advanced technology
and/or strategic location require "probable cause" and, perhaps, prior judicial
approval. The varieties of police behavior may be innumerable, as Professor
Amsterdam suggests," but they do tend to fit into broad, predictable
categories. Despite the difficulty of such a task, however, it is preferable to
burying the whole problem under the headstone, "No Search."
C. Possible Accommodations
Even a system based fundamentally on the current Katz formulation could,
it is suggested, be enhanced by paying more attention to the officer's conduct
and motivation. The Court may remain indifferent to that motivation when the
officer physically enters a house (always calling this a search) and in an "open
field" (always calling this not a search). But in curtilage and other intermediateplace cases (cases in which the officer is located in an unprotected place but

75. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
76. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
77. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).

78. See e.g., Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1988); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See
See
See
See
See
See

e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
e.g., United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1978).
e.g., United States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1985).
e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
Amsterdam, supra note 59, at 381.
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looking or listening into a protected place) closer scrutiny of the techniques and
motivations of the policeman could be considered in answering the central Katz
question. Katz himself, as the Court noted, could not in that glass phonebooth
have reasonably expected that he would not be seen or even overheard with the
naked ear.' It was particularly aggressive conduct involving special equipment
which he could reasonably expect to be free from. The first and best answer to
the question "What is our reasonable expectation of privacy?" is, "From whom
or what?" We may reasonably expect that police will see into our houses from
the sidewalk, but when they employ flashlights and binoculars, startrons and
helicopters, we may reasonably demand that they do so only under careful
constitutional scrutiny. Under the post-Katz cases, however, once the Supreme
Court finds we cannot reasonably expect privacy from every imaginable
intrusion, it affords protection from none!
CONCLUSION

To conclude, fourth-amendment analysis should begin by scrutinizing
governmental activity to determine if it is the kind of activity that the provision
is concerned about. The amendment, insofar as it extends to searches, should
be understood to "reach" any physical seeking for a governmental purpose.
Such an understanding would insure that the Court's function as guardian of
constitutional liberties will not be jeopardized by decisions which put the
"reach" too short. Once "reach" is too short, other branches of government
must act to remedy injustices; it is crucial to note that many victims of
governmental abuses have historically not had much access to those other
institutions.
Under my proposal, which governmental searches are reasonable remains,
as before, to be debated in an ongoing judicial discourse.
The fourth
amendment should not "grasp" everything it can "reach".
Indeed, the
Constitution's "reach" must exceed its "grasp", or what's a Supreme Court for?

85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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